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Federal Decentralization
Forthcoming, Virginia Law Review
David Fontana*
Abstract
Constitutional law relies on the diffusion of powers among different institutions to ensure
that no one person or faction controls power. Federalism and the separation of powers have
been presented as the primary institutional arrangements generating this diffusion. Scholars
and jurists alike, though, have largely neglected to consider another form of diffusion: federal
decentralization. Federal power cannot be appropriately diffused if it is geographically
concentrated in those in a single place. Federal decentralization ensures that federal officials in
Washington and in places distant and therefore different from Washington compete with and
constrain one another. This Article identifies and evaluates federal decentralization as a
dimension of constitutional law.
This Article first uncovers the long but lost history of federal decentralization, and places
it at the core of our constitutional experience from the Founding to its current moment on
constitutional center stage. The First Congress located important federal officials in a different
metropolitan area than the President and Congress, and arranged for the Congress and the
White House to operate in different buildings in different neighborhoods. The current Congress
is considering legislation proposed by both parties that would increase federal decentralization.
This Article then argues that federal decentralization makes visible the diffusions of
power that federalism and separation of powers cannot provide, and executed properly attempts
to provide them. It gives federalism the voice it needs, and separation of powers the exit it lacks.
Federalism aspires to empower local majorities, and federal decentralization enhances the voice
of local majorities by making them empowered neighbors rather than unfamiliar strangers to
federal officials—or even permits local majorities to act as federal officials themselves. The
separation of powers aspires to generate rivalrous branches, but rival interests can only be
generated by ensuring that sometimes federal officials exit Washington rather than operate in it.
Federal decentralization, though, risks injecting excessive diffusion into the American system. It
therefore requires its own vocabulary to recognize and resolve the persistent set of institutional
design challenges that it raises.
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Federal Decentralization
Introduction
Constitutional law relies on the diffusion of powers among “distinct and separate
departments” of government to ensure that no one person or faction controls power.1 James
Madison famously celebrated federalism and the separation of powers as combining together to
provide the “double security” of diffusion.2 Scholars and jurists alike, though, have largely
neglected to consider the third security of diffusion: federal decentralization. Federal power
cannot be appropriately diffused if it is geographically concentrated in those in a single place.
Federal decentralization ensures that federal officials in Washington and in places distant and
therefore different from Washington compete with and constrain one another. While federalism
is the “oldest question” of constitutional law,3 and separation of powers is a “sacred” element of
constitutional law,4 federal decentralization has remained largely invisible as a tool of
constitutional law sweeping across the ages and across the branches.
This Article identifies and evaluates federal decentralization as a dimension of
constitutional law. Once we make federal decentralization visible, we can see it constantly
debated and deployed as a tool of constitutional law. The First Congress located the Attorney
General and other important federal officials in a different metropolitan area than the President
and Congress, and agreed that it would be “nothing short of insanity” to locate the President and
the Congress in the same building in Washington.5 During the height of the Great Depression,
the regional Federal Reserve Bank in Atlanta advocated a distinctive monetary activism credited
for helping to save the distinctive Southern economy.6 A federal district court judge in Hawaii
1

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (“The declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers of government, of course, was to
‘diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty.’”) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
2
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 323 (James Madison). Scholars have also argued that federalism and
separation of powers reinforce one another. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the
Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 459 (2012) (“[S]tates check the federal executive in an era of
expansive executive power [by] relying on congressionally conferred authority and casting themselves as Congress's
faithful agents”); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321,
1323 (2001) (“[U]nconventional federal lawmaking implicates not only separation of powers, but also federalism—
at least to the extent that such lawmaking purports to displace state law.”). In a forthcoming article, Aziz Huq and I
elaborate on the causal mechanisms promoting these twin pillars of constitutional law. See David Fontana & Aziz
Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). For my previous
reflections on particular features of federal decentralization in symposium or response essays, see David Fontana,
The Administrative Difference of Powers, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 81 (2016) (responding to Jon D. Michaels,
An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (2015); David Fontana, The Narrowing of
Federal Power by the American Political Capital, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS L.J. 733, 738 (2015); David
Fontana, Placing the Government in Fragile Democracies, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985 (2015).
3
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
4
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926) (quoting James Madison, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581 (1789) (Joseph
Gates ed., 1834)).
5
See FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, THE FIRST CONGRESS: HOW JAMES MADISON, GEORGE WASINGTON, AND A GROUP
OF EXTRAORDINARY MEN INVENTED THE GOVERNMENT 226 (2016). One commentator captured the sentiment by
stating that the legislative and executive branches must “eye each other with Constitutionally ordained respect and
suspicion from the opposite ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.” Id. at 116.
6
See Gary Richardson & William Troost, Monetary Intervention Mitigated Banking Panics During the Great
Depression: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Federal Reserve District Border, 1929-1933, 117 J. POL. ECON.
1031 (2009) (examining the different responses and different outcomes generated by those responses across the
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invalidated an executive order on immigration this year,7 with opponents criticizing the power of
a federal judge that far from Washington.8 The experience of a senator from Alaska visiting
with individuals in her home state shaped her actions on health care legislation.9 Indeed, the
current Congress is considering legislation sponsored by both parties to expand federal
decentralization.10
Federal decentralization is both timeless and timely. It is timeless because of its salience
across generations and across jurisdictions. It has been a significant feature of state constitutional
law.11 Other countries have utilized federal decentralization, from Germany’s distribution of
officials across many metropolitan areas12 to South Africa’s utilization of three different
metropolitan areas to house the legislative, executive and judicial branches.13 The federal
decentralization utilized by the European Union was a motivating example in debates about
Brexit.14 The sentiment locally and globally has always been and remains that where you stand
politically depends on where you sit. While there may come a day when political behaviors are

regional banks). See generally Sarah Binder & Mark Spindel, Monetary Politics: Origins of the Federal Reserve, 27
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1 (2013) (describing congressional interest in creating regional banks and how that has
affected federal banking policy).
7
Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00050, 2017 WL 1011673 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2017).
8
See Aaron Blake, Jeff Sessions Criticizes Hawaii Judge, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2017, at A16 (reporting on
interview in which Attorney General Jeff Sessions criticized a judge exercising such power from “an Island in the
Pacific”)
9
See Carl Hulse, Lisa Murkowski, A Swing Vote on Health Care, Isn’t Swayed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2017, at A1
(describing the role that Senator Lisa Murkowski’s background in Alaska played in shaping her vote).
10
See Ben Wofford, Inside the Radical, Self-Destructive, and Probably Impossible Plan to Move the Government
Out of Washington, WASHINGTONIAN, July 2017, at 25 (referencing bolder legislation considered in the House and
more widely supported Senate plans). See also Ross Douthat, Break Up the Liberal City, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
2017, at SR9 (mentioning the economic features of this debate); Jenna Portnoy, Drain the Swamp? No, Let’s Just
Move It, Rep. Chaffetz Suggests, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2017, at A2 (highlighting congressional action); Matt
Yglesias, Let’s Relocate a Bunch of Government Agencies to the Midwest, VOX, Dec. 9, 2016,
https://www.vox.com/new-money/2016/12/9/13881712/move-government-to-midwest (considering the economic
ramifications of this debate)
11
See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 894 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement by James Madison) [hereinafter
Madison, Location of Capital] (“We see the operation of this [decentralized] sentiment fully exemplified in what has
taken place in the several states.”); Erik J. Engstrom, Jesse R. Hammond & John T. Scott, Capitol Mobility:
Madisonian Representation and the Location and Relocation of Capitals in the United States, 107 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 225, 225 (2013) (noting the historical importance of state officials and state capitals being “as near as possible
to the population centroid of the relevant political jurisdiction”); Bill Mahoney, A Rare Sight: Cuomo, In Public, In
Albany, POLITICO, Dec. 15, 2016 http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/cuomos-publicappearances-in-albany-still-rare-108097 (“[T]his year there have been 201 days in which [New York Governor
Andrew Cuomo] has spent at least some time in New York City and 88 ‘in the New York City area’ [and] a
significant number of days in Albany—62, to be specific.”).
12
See Alan Cowell, Memo From Berlin: In Germany’s Capitals, Cold War Memories and Imperial Ghosts, Jan. 23,
2011, N.Y. TIMES, at A15.
13
See Alan Mabin, South African Capital Cities, in CAPITAL CITIES IN AFRICA: POWER AND POWERLESSNESS (Simon
Bekker & Goran Therborn, eds., 2011).
14
See James Kanter, “You are Ridiculous,” E.U.’s Juncker Tells Parliament, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2017, at A1
(“[T]he European Parliament has come in for particular criticism for the way it shuttles monthly between Brussels,
the headquarters of union’s administrative machinery, and Strasbourg, 270 miles away.”).
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not shaped by location, the available empirical evidence now points towards the continuing
power of place.15
Federal decentralization is timely because it is emerging as one of the defining
constitutional issues of our time. Americans have been saying across chronological and
ideological boundaries that they distrust the federal government because it is composed so
heavily of officials different from them—officials so different from them in part because they are
distant from them. Individuals that work in distant places are more likely to be perceived as
different and therefore less deserving of trust.16 The reasons that citizens often give for
distrusting the federal government sound in distance: that the federal government is out of touch
with their problems, for instance.17 Political and legal leaders of both parties in all three branches
are hearing this message, and are considering expanding federal decentralization as a means for
constitutional law to respond.
Federal decentralization does not have a seat at the constitutional law table, and the
account in this Article uses two primary frames through which to argue that it should. First, this
Article provides an interpretive account, demonstrating the presence of federal decentralization
at major moments in American constitutional law. My account is not meant to be exhaustive, but
merely to provide salient examples of the role that the separation of places has played in
designing and deciding American constitutional law. This history illustrates both the
commonalities and complexities of federal decentralization, as well as its promise and perils.
Second, federal decentralization sheds light on doctrinal debates related to both
federalism and the separation of powers. Federal decentralization makes visible the diffusions of
power that federalism and separation of powers cannot provide, and executed properly attempts
to provide them. It gives federalism the voice it needs, and separation of powers the exit it

15

The economic geography literature has considered how knowledge spillovers are more substantial when
individuals are located more proximately. See, e.g., David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of
Residential Stability, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (pointing to the evidence of “information spillovers
between neighbors” explaining why some places are more productive than others). The empirical literature in the
social sciences has found that political behavior is substantially shaped by the place-based networks that still define
us. Our virtual interactions “work synergistically with face-to-face contact,” and therefore “our important
interactions are arranged virtually and transacted physically.” Diana Mok et al., Does Distance Matter in the Age of
the Internet?, 47 URB. STUD. 2747, 2750 (2010). See, e.g., John Brehm & James T. Hamilton, Noncompliance in
Environmental Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the Law?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 444, 449 n.5 (1996)
(finding different regulatory behavior across regional administrative offices); David M. Hedge, A Spatial Model of
Regulation, 21 AM. POL. RES. 387 (1993) (providing a model and empirical evidence of different official behavior
across metropolitan areas); William R. Hobbs, Age and Partisan Stability: How Much of the Association is
Explained by Continuity in Social and Personal Life? (2017) (manuscript on file with author) (“A residence change
roughly doubles (1.7 times) the rate at which respondents change party in a four-year period.”).
16
See, e.g., Meric S. Gertler, Tacit Knowledge and the Economic Geography of Context, or the Undefinable
Tacitness of Being There, 3 J. ECON. GEO. 75, 79 (2003) (identifying “language, conventions, codes, or
communication, and trust” as hard to transmit across distance and generating distrust across distance) (emphasis
added).
17
See THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BEYOND DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW THEIR GOVERNMENT (Nov. 23,
2015),
http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/4-ratings-of-federal-agencies-congress-and-the-supreme-court/
[hereinafter, PEW, DISTRUST].
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lacks.18 Federalism “allow[s] national minorities to constitute local majorities” by giving them
control over state governments.19 Local majorities will never have the voice they need if they are
merely “servants” (in Heather Gerken’s powerful framing) in state governments to federal
officials exercising federal power far away.20 Federal decentralization enhances the voice of
local majorities by making them empowered neighbors rather than unfamiliar strangers to federal
officials—or even making local majorities into federal officials themselves. The separation of
powers aspires to empower “opposite and rival interests”21 to control different branches of the
federal government, but rival interests can only be generated by ensuring that sometimes federal
officials exit Washington rather than operate in it.
To make the analysis concrete, this Article provides new readings of controversial
Supreme Court cases addressing federalism and the separation of powers. Doctrines long in
duration and broad in significance need to be revisited once federal decentralization is made
legible. The Court’s commandeering cases—now the subject of much attention during the
Trump Administration22—hold that the “federal government may not compel the States to enact
or administer a federal regulatory program.”23 Many of the statutes that the Court has invalidated
for commandeering states feature federal decentralization. When federal officials work near
state officials they are much more likely to work with them, though, calling into question the
coercion anchoring the Court’s anti-commandeering cases.
The Court’s executive power cases require that the President must have “clear and
effective” control over agency officials exercising executive power.24 This control will be
contingent on the locations of those doing the supervising and of those being supervised. Recent
decisions by the Supreme Court and by lower federal courts have questioned presidential control
over agency officials located a short walk from the White House.25 It is much harder to argue
that the President lacks “clear and effective” control over officials when the President or his top
advisors know these officials well from their location across the street as contrasted with rarely
seeing them because they are across the country.

18

See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,
AND STATES (1970).

EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,

19

Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All The Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 12 (2010).
20
Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633, 2635 (2006) (“Unlike the sovereign, the
servant lacks autonomy and, if push comes to shove, must cede to the higher authority. The power of the servant
thus stems mainly from dependence: The fact that the higher authority needs the servant to perform a task creates
space not just for discretionary decision-making, but also for bureaucratic pushback.”). See also Abbe R. Gluck,
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and
Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 550 (2011) (noting the problems with the fact that "most of the existing federalism
literature has considered federalism from the perspective of states").
21
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 302-03 (James Madison).
22
See Chicago to File Lawsuit Over Sanctuary Cities Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2017, at A1 (noting the lawsuits
filed against the Trump Administration related to commandeering sanctuary cities).
23
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
24
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
25
See id. See also P.H.H. Corporation vs. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(questioning the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
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Federal decentralization provides diffusions of power that federalism and the separation
of powers cannot, but in doing so risks injecting too many diffusions into the American system.
Institutional designers therefore face a complicated task in calibrating the quality and quantity of
federal decentralization. Rather than disproving that federal decentralization deserves a place
alongside federalism and the separation of powers, these complications prove that federal
decentralization raises similar questions to those facing the two traditional pillars of structural
constitutional law.26 This Article provides a vocabulary to understand how to make comparable
institutional estimates when it comes to federal decentralization. The hope is to take a first step
towards demonstrating the utility of an analysis centered on federal decentralization, and to open
the door to a new scholarly agenda that focuses on this third pillar of structural constitutional
law.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I foregrounds federal decentralization as a
foundational part of our constitutional experience. Part II identifies the analytical toolkit of
federal decentralization. Part III considers the doctrinal implications of federal decentralization.
I.

Federal Decentralization in Theory and Practice

Federal decentralization has been part of the constitutional debate at crucial moments in
the American constitutional experience. The urgency of its efforts has only increased since their
original articulation. The increasingly unique nature of Washington as a metropolitan area is
inevitably paired with the unique nature of the federal government. As The New York Times
reported early in the Obama Administration, officials in the federal government always “learn[]
that Washington often changes you more than you change it.”27 Ensuring that power is
appropriately diffused has therefore involved ensuring that power is appropriately located in
places distant from—and therefore different from—Washington. The lost history of these efforts
is rendered visible by illustrating key moments in those efforts.28
A. Founding
Separation of places as a feature of structural constitutional law was imagined and
implemented at the constitutional beginning. Theories of how the Constitution was designed
incorporated federal decentralization, and the new federal government created by the
Constitution incorporated federal decentralization in practice.

26

See Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments, the Structural Constitution and the Problem of Executive
“Underenforcement,” 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (2012) (“Balance-of-powers arguments are ubiquitous in
judicial opinions and academic articles [yet] the concept of the balance of powers has never received a satisfactory
theoretical treatment.”). See also David Fontana, The Geography of Campaign Finance Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (identifying structural tradeoffs in the First Amendment context).
27
See Ashley Parker, All The Obama 20-Somethings, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at MM46 (reporting on the unique
nature of the Washington metropolitan area).
28
Scholars have produced compelling and important work identifying the category of “regions” in administrative
law, but have not yet considered how federal decentralization transcends the ages and branches (and regions) in
practice, and therefore challenges constitutional law in theory. See Yishai Blank & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Reviving
Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PENN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017); Dave Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58 (2016).
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1. Theory
Federal decentralization has largely escaped scholarly attention because of the intellectual
energy dedicated to excavating the centralizing interests of the Founders29 and the impressive
capital city that resulted from those centralizing interests. One member of Congress in the early
Republic referred to Washington as the “Metropolis of America,”30 and argued that Washington
“might be compared to the heart in the human body. It was a center from which the principles of
life were carried to the extremities.”31 Some at the Founding spoke of the location of federal
power in a great national capital as something so important as never to be changed—an
unamendable constitutional commitment.32 The argument that a great nation needed a great
capital was a big part of the debate before the House of Representatives in 2017.33
Constitutional theory is always “impure’ in the sense that it features several
complicated—and at times antagonistic—theoretical claims by the same theorists addressing the
same concerns.34 Founding constitutional theory was certainly interested in enhancing federal
power and creating a federal capital that could handle a capable federal government. At the
same time, though, it was also very much concerned with complimenting that with a healthy
dose of federal decentralization in theory—and, as the next Section discusses, in practice. There
was agreement that federal decentralization was an important dimension of structural
constitutional law, even if there was debate about how much to decentralize.
First, a defining unit of political life at the Founding was the geographically defined
political community. James Madison in Federalist 10 mentioned the “less opportunity of
communication and concert” across greater distances that made distinct places into different
communities.35 Because places were separated, two mechanisms generated durable differences
across places. Different places attracted and maintained different types of people, producing
different “selection effects.”36 Geographical mobility was much less common and information
about other places much less plentiful, suggesting that location generated a durable and stable
population base. Virginia was a term that defined a stable political community in a physical

29

See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
168-69 (1996) (explaining some of the reasons for and symptoms of this concern about enhancing federal power);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 528-31 (1969) (same).
30
See BORDEWICH, supra note 5, at 112 (quoting Georgia Congressman James Jackson).
31
Id. at 6.
32
Id. at 255 (quoting newspaper writers and members of Congress).
33
See House Committee on Oversight & Government Reform, Full Committee Business Meeting, YouTube (Mar.
10, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LK8PSM3edoA (at 34:53) [hereinafter House Oversight,
Decentralization Hearing] (featuring comments by Virginia Congressman Gerald Connolly that the American
capital was “sacred ground” and that the “capital is iconic”).
34
See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of Legal Theories,
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1819 (2016) (“Prescriptive legal theories become not only increasingly complicated but
also increasingly compromised, by their own normative lights. . . . [t]he theories work themselves impure.”).
35
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 78 (James Madison).
36
See Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REV. 953, 953 (2005) (highlighting
“selection effects” as those that regulate “which (potential) officials are selected” and treatment effects or
“incentive-based effects” as those focused “on the creation of optimal incentives for those who happen to occupy
official posts at any given time”).
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place, not just a formal legal entity called a state.37 The problem of placing the federal capital in
one place and having all federal officials there was that it would rely on the narrowing selection
effects of a single place.38 James Madison articulated this concern about centralization in an
important speech in the first Congress.39
Different places also produced different “treatment effects.”40 Madison wrote in
Federalist 46 that individuals will hear “more domestic and personal interests of the people” that
are physically proximate, meaning that argument pools about what government should do will
spillover more locally.41 Different places also produced place-based personal and professional
reputational networks generating costs for defying the norms of those networks. Madison wrote
that individuals will have “ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party
attachments” with “a greater proportion of the people” who are physically proximate.42
Individuals would be most concerned about their local reputation. Individuals would not want to
alienate those with whom they are closest, and those with whom they are closest would be
located closely.43
Second, the perpetually geographically distributed nature of political ideologies was seen
as a feature of a successful American constitutional experiment to be leveraged, rather than a bug
that would doom it. The separation of places was foundational to American constitutional
success rather than threatening to its existence. The famous Madisonian principle that
“[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition”44 required that place be made to counteract
place. The virtue of the American experiment was that its “greater sphere of country” meant
there will be many “local situations” and therefore inevitably conflicting place-based political
factions.45 The new constitutional experiment would only work if it did “[e]xtend the sphere”

37

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (providing to Congress the power “to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be”) (emphasis added); U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed
or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States,
or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”).
38
James Madison remarked that those located distantly from the capital would have to be given more “powerful
inducements” and “liberal compensations” to get them to come to a capital located distantly, and that would violate
equality of representation. See Madison, Location of Capital, supra note 11.
39
See id. (“The more remote the government is, the greater will be the necessity of making liberal compensations,
and holding out powerful inducements, in order to obtain the services of fit characters, from every part of the
union.”)
40
See Vermeule, supra note 36, at 953 (highlighting treatment effects or “incentive-based effects” as those focused
“on the creation of optimal incentives for those who happen to occupy official posts at any given time”).
41
See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 294 (James Madison).
42
See id.
43
See Madison, Location of Capital, supra note 11, at 862 (“Those who are most adjacent to the seat of legislation,
will always possess advantages over others. An earlier knowledge of the laws; a greater influence in enacting them;
better opportunities for anticipating them, and a thousand other circumstances, will give a superiority to those who
are thus situated.”).
44
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 322 (James Madison).
45
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 82 (James Madison) (arguing that “local situation[s]” would always
produce geographical ideological variations). See also James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing
Constitutional Amendments, June 8, 1789, in WRITINGS 437, 448-49 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (noting that “a
common interest or passion is less apt to be felt” because of the extended republic).
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within which power was exercised to ensure decentralized interests were given voice.46 Madison
argued that “there is no one right” more important than ensuring federal power was
geographically accessible to everyone.47
The failures of British colonial rule cited were often blamed on—as the Declaration of
Independence phrased it—the fact that power was located “at places unusual, uncomfortable, and
distant.”48 The state constitutions that shaped the backdrop for the federal Constitution made sure
to locate their capitals in the population centroid of the state so that all factions could equally
access state power, and distributed state offices within the state. Madison’s important floor
speech in the House of Representatives on capital location made note of these state efforts to
ensure power was appropriately located.49 The many locations of national power before the
Constitution (at least eight for the Congress that preceded the Constitution50) led Madison to
remark in Federalist 43 of the potential need to remove federal power to an entirely new capital
altogether.51
Given this concern with federal decentralization as a matter of Founding constitutional
theory, it should not be surprising that federal decentralization was constantly raised as a topic of
constitutional debate. The scholarly debate about the treatment of the presidency at the
Founding has focused on the significance of a single individual heading the executive branch52
and therefore speaking for the entire United States.53 The Constitutional Convention debated
whether “three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the Country”54
would be necessary for the President to fulfill this role. One delegate argued that a single
President could not govern for the entire country because their “appointments would generally be
in favor of . . . the center of the Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on
46

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 83 (James Madison). See also id. (“[T]he smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will
they concert and execute their plans of oppression.”).
47
Madison, Location of Capital, supra note 11, at 863 (“If these great rights be the basis of republics, and if there be
a double necessity of attending to them in a federal republic, it is further to be considered, that there is no one right,
of which the people can judge with more ease and certainty, and of which they will judge with more jealousy, than
of the establishment of the permanent seat of government.”). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 1, at 279
(James Madison) (noting concerns about “too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single state, and
would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government”).
48
UNITED STATES DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776). Madison stated during the debate about capital location
in the First Congress that “[i]t is important, that every part of the community should have the power of sending, with
equal facility, to the seat of government, such representatives to take care of their interests.” Madison, Location of
Capital, supra note 11, at 862.
49
See Madison, Location of Capital, supra note 11, at 862.
50
See KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE CREATION OF WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE IDEA AND LOCATION OF THE AMERICAN
CAPITAL 14-72 (1993).
51
See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 1, at 279 (James Madison) (noting concerns about “too great a public
pledge to be left in the hands of a single state”).
52
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl.1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.”).
53
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1167 (1992) (“All unitary executive theorists base their constructions in part on
the Article II Vesting Clause.”).
54
James Madison, Proceedings of Committee of the Whole House, May 30-June 19, in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 88 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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equal footing.”55 The argument that carried the day was that “a single magistrate [w]as most
likely to answer . . . the remote parts.”56 One President would try to appeal to all parts of the
country, and not just the place in the country that constituted their political home.57 Presidential
decentralization was rejected in design, but not the need to achieve something similar in practice.
2. Practice
This constitutional commitment to federal decentralization was made real through several
different features of constitutional practice in the early Republic. First, federal power would be
decentralized because of the location and nature of the federal capital. Washington was equally
accessible because of its central location within the new country. During the heated debates in
the first session of Congress about the constitutional dimensions of capital location, James
Madison argued for a “strict adherence” to a central location for the new capital.58
Washington was also to be permeable, the kind of place “equally open and available to
all.”59 Many thought that the capital should be located in one of America’s great cities, in a place
like New York City or Philadelphia.60 These cities were the most comprehensive places in the
United States at the time, and both housed the federal government for periods of time before it
moved to Washington. The argument was that these cities were big enough places that they
contained within them a little Massachusetts and a little Virginia. Thomas Jefferson disagreed,
and argued that the experience of residing in one of these cities transformed people, making them
no longer truly sensitive to the interests of people in other places. Jefferson specifically had in
mind the great European capitals of the time—London and Paris—when he wrote that “[w]hen
we get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, we shall become as corrupt as
Europe.”61 By contrast, Washington was not much of a place at the time. A new location would
not have established prejudices towards one part of the country or another.62
Second, important federal officials would be decentralized either seasonally or
permanently. The text of Article I was thought to contemplate this type of decentralization. The
same paragraph that creates the “district” to become “the seat of the Government” also mentions
other places that would house federal officials. There would be other “places” outside of the
“district” that would feature “other needful buildings” that the federal government would

55

Id.
Id.
57
Id. (“If one man should be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its interests.
If three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages.”)
(quoting Pierce Butler).
58
Madison, Location of Capital, supra note 11, at 862. See also id. (quoting Madison as arguing for the importance
of “plac[ing] the government in that spot which will be least removed from every part of the empire.”)
59
Id.
60
See BOWLING, supra note 50, at 15-16.
61
THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 918 (1984). See also 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 173 (Andrew A.
Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1904) (“I view great cities as pestilential to the morals, the health and the liberties
of man.”).
62
See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 1, at 279 (noting concerns about “too great a public pledge to be left in
the hands of a single state”).
56
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utilize.63 The decentralization would be seasonal but substantial at the highest levels of
government. The Justices would be outside of Washington sometimes more than half of the
year.64 A federal government that did not engage in tasks of enormous complexity or in
enormous quantities65 meant that members of Congress and even the President could leave tiny
Washington and return to their homes with great frequency during the year. Even the Attorney
General did not move to Washington for many decades after that was position was created in
1789.66
The decentralization would be permanent for many of those below the highest levels of
federal office.67 United States Attorneys were identified by the Judiciary Act of 1789 as being
located in districts outside of Washington.68 Federal marshals were located within geographically
defined districts outside of Washington and were compensated based on their location.69 The
first Bank of the United States remained in Philadelphia even after other offices left for
Washington.70 Washington and other metropolitan areas received regional banks in the years to
come, but the primary Federal Bank office remained in Philadelphia for many years.71 The
United States Mint, an important federal office at the time, remained in Philadelphia.72 The
Judiciary Act of 1789 divided the lower federal courts into thirteen geographically defined
districts.73 The district judge in each district was required to “reside in the district”74 and to hold
sessions in geographically defined places within that district.75
Early debates about constitutional principles also focused on how best to decentralize as a
means of complimenting for the deficiencies of federalism and the separation of powers.
Federalism required federal decentralization so that the federal government could compete with
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Compare U.S. CONST., Art. I., §8, cl.17 (granting to Congress “exclusive Legislation in all cases whatsoever, over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States”)
with U.S. CONST., Art. I., §8, cl.17 (granting to Congress “like authority over all Places . . . . for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings”).
64
See Maeva Marcus, Introduction, to 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, at 1, 3 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988).
65
See Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 50 (2016) (“The government is not just visibly larger but—along countless dimensions in the military,
economic, and social spheres—vastly more capable.”).
66
See BORDEWICH, supra note 5, at 242.
67
See BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT 112 (2009). See also LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS:
A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 199 (1948) (demonstrating that field service officials “far outnumbered
those in the central establishment”).
68
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (“And there shall be appointed in each district a meet
person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such district.”).
69
See id. § 27, 1 Stat. 74-75 (“That a marshal shall be appointed in and for each district”).
70
PHILADELPHIA FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY
OF CENTRAL BANKING 11 (2012).
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Id. at 15.
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See The United States Mint, About Us, https://www.usmint.gov/learn/history?action=history.
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Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 74-75.
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Id. §3.
75
Id. §§ 2-3. See also id. (requiring that these marshals “take an oath or affirmation . . .. within their respective
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state governments for local affections from local places.76 Separation of powers required
branches that would cooperate but not entirely collude, and the physical location of the branches
was a crucial means of ensuring that. There were debates about whether to have the President
located within the same building as the Congress in the decade that the federal government was
in Philadelphia (before it moved to Washington in 1800). One commentator described it as
“nothing short of insanity” to locate them in the same building, and a threat to the new
Constitution.77 It was seen as important once the federal government moved to Washington that
the legislative and executive branches continue to “eye each other with Constitutionally ordained
respect and suspicion from the opposite ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.”78 The new Department
of the Treasury was to be in a different building than both the President and the Congress.79 The
Supreme Court eventually had to have its own building, because for it to share a building would
“symbolically but significantly imperil the balance of powers.”80
To be clear, while decentralization played a central role, it was to be balanced against the
important role that centralized federal power was to play in the new Republic.81 Founding
constitutional theory featured many arguments that decentralization could go too far. When the
Continental Congress met in Philadelphia in 1783, local soldiers seeking monetary compensation
rebelled and threatened the Continental Congress.82 The worst was avoided, but this possibility
made the Founding generation skeptical of being excessively dependent on factions not
accountable to the entire nation. Some historians even believe that Alexander Hamilton arranged
for the Continental Congress to meet in a distant place that was unsafe to reiterate the need for
centralized federal power.83 The exclusive power that Congress had over the seat of government
was meant to forestall decentralized interests from dominating federal power too much in the
future. There was to be a capital away from everyone else for part of what the federal
government did in the new American Republic.
B. Trajectories
As the federal government grew in size and complexity, so did the metropolitan area
housing the federal government—and so did its distance and differences from a country itself
growing in size and complexity. When the federal government relocated from Philadelphia to
Washington in 1800, it was a permeable institution located in the center of the country. The
largest executive agency that was relocated was the Treasury Department—with a mere 69
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See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 294 (James Madison) (arguing that state governments would
dominate popular affections and there needed to be efforts to ensure that the federal government could at least
compete for some of their affections).
77
See BORDEWICH, supra note 5, at 226.
78
Id. (emphasis added).
79
Id. at 116.
80
Id. at 225. See also Humphrey's Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (“The fundamental necessity of
maintaining each of the three general departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive
influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question.”).
81
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 303 (James Madison) (“[W]hether we consider the subject
with regard to the executive, the legislative, or the judicial departments, we see the soundest reasons for fixing the
government in that place, which may be the most permanent centre of territory and population.”).
82
See BOWLING, supra note 50, at 30-34.
83
Id. at 31.
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officials.84 Congress had only eight permanent and full-time staffers.85 As one scholar of those
years wrote, “[f]ourteen years after the arrival of the government [in Washington], there was still
no there there.”86 Debates about federal decentralization therefore focused on how much
decentralization was necessary to ensure that federal power exercised in an increasingly
distinctive Washington would be pitted against the increasingly distinctive way that federal
power would be exercised in other places.
1. Civil War and Reconstruction
In the years after the Civil War, the constitutional changes created by the Reconstruction
Amendments were viewed through the lens of federal decentralization. By now it is a statement
of constitutional conventional wisdom that the Reconstruction Amendments generated a
substantial reallocation of power from state governments to the federal government.87 New
limitations were placed on private and state power in the Thirteenth Amendment and on state
power in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The enforcement power granted to
Congress in the Reconstruction Amendments was meant to resemble the broad power granted to
Congress in the Necessary and Proper Clause.88
The Reconstruction Amendments were often justified as reflective of an insufficient
separation of place in the original constitutional document. After the capital moved to
Washington in 1800, there were twenty-four straight years of Southern presidents, and many
complained about that.89 How could there be a due concern for all state governments if those in
federal office were all from one part of the country? How could there be separation of powers if
all three branches were controlled by the same part of the country? One member of Congress
spoke controversially on the floor of Congress about the federal government featuring a “disloyal
element” that prejudiced it in favor of the South.90
Some state legislatures therefore voted to instruct their federal Senators and
Representatives to move parts of the federal government to someplace further West.91 In 1867,
84

See BORDEWICH, supra note 5, at 242.
Id.
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Id. at 260. For a compelling examination of some of the events discussed below, see an excellent article by Whit
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L. REV. 527 (1995).
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See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REV. 26, 85 (2000) (referencing the effect of the Reconstruction Amendments on increasing “broad federal
power”).
88
See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 614-15 (1870) (“It must be taken then as finally settled, so far as
judicial decisions can settle anything, that the words of the Necessary and Proper Clause were “equivalent” to the
word “appropriate” [in the Reconstruction Amendments].”). See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20
(1883), cited in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment
“clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States.”).
89
See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 51 (2000).
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CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3174 (June 15, 1868).
91
See RESOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF KANSAS IN FAVOR OF THE REMOVAL OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL FROM
WASHINGTON TO FORT LEAVENWORTH MILITARY RESERVATION, KANSAS, S. Misc. Doc. No. 28, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess. (Jan. 26, 1870); RESOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF IOWA IN FAVOR OF REMOVING THE CAPITAL OF THE
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Representative John A. Logan of Illinois called for a special congressional committee or even a
Constitutional Convention to consider these issues.92 St. Louis became the favored, compromise
location for the “Reconstruction” capital,93 since it could be the new population centroid of the
country. Walt Whitman’s Democratic Vistas essay in 1871 captured the mood when he wrote
that “[o]ur future national capital may not be where the present one is. It is possible, nay likely,
that it will migrate a thousand or two miles [so our country can be] re-founded, and every thing
belonging to it made on a different plan . . . far more superb.94
The increase in federal power that dominates discussions about the Reconstruction
Amendments was not entirely an increase in centralized federal power. Many of the most
significant legislative efforts after the Civil War featured federal decentralization to mitigate the
limitations that the Reconstruction Amendments would place on state governments. The
Reconstruction Acts enacted in 1867 that authorized military occupation of the South featured
five military districts, each with federal officials placed in the actual districts in the South.95
Some believed that the federal government would once again be too dominated by the South if
federal officials were located there. Others in the South complained that federal officials would
be in the South but of the North because so many appointed officials were veterans of the Union
army.
Similar legal designs and objections were raised about other elements of Reconstruction.
The Freedmen’s Bureau was coordinated by the Department of War and was intended to assist
recently emancipated slaves. The Bureau was visualized as a crucial part of realizing the
promise of the Reconstruction Amendments.96 The statute creating the Freedmen’s Bureau
provided for the President to appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate at least ten
officials—and a military official—to oversee efforts in each state of the Confederacy from within
each state of the Confederacy.97
2. Progressive Era
The Progressive Era featured two of the most significant decentralizations in American
constitutional history because of the significance of the institutions involved. Those designing
these decentralizations argued that the separation of places was indispensable to the success of
these institutions. The Evarts Act of 1891 expanded the footprint of the federal courts outside of
the Washington metropolitan area. The Evarts Act created decentralized federal courts of
No. 73, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 7, 1870); RESOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS IN FAVOR OF THE REMOVAL OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL TO SOME POINT IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY, S.
Misc. Doc. No. 135, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 13, 1870);LEGISLATURE OF KANSAS IN FAVOR OF THE REMOVAL OF
THE NATIONAL CAPITAL FROM WASHINGTON TO FORT LEAVENWORTH MILITARY RESERVATION, KANSAS, S. Misc.
Doc. No. 28, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 26, 1870);
92
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 209 (Dec. 16, 1987).
93
Removal of the Capital, CHI. TRIB., July 5, 1869, at 2 (“It is time that the public mind, at least in the Western,
Southwestern and Pacific States, were definitely turned to the question of the future location of our National Capital,
as one demanding not merely discussion, but speedy action.”).
94
WALT WHITMAN, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS 165 (1871).
95
Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
96
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1043-46
(1995) (discussing the history and logic of this).
97
See Law Creating The Freedmen’s Bureau (1865), http://www.freedmen.umd.edu/fbact.htm.
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appeals to supplement the decentralized district courts.98 Later federal statutes even more
explicitly required these judges to reside99 and operate100 in those circuits to avoid the grasps of
Washington.101 If there was to be judicial independence—supporters of the Evarts Act argued—
federal courts needed to be accessible (and thus decentralized) and not excessively integrated
within Washington (and thus decentralized).102
When the Federal Reserve Act was being debated in the early twentieth century, Paul
Warburg, an influential theorist of banking independence at the time, stated that “[t]he view was
generally held that centralization of banking would inevitably result in one of two alternatives:
either complete governmental control, which meant politics in banking, or control by ‘Wall
Street,’ which meant banking in politics.”103 Carter Glass, the member of Congress primarily
responsible for the Act, was even clearer: he worried that a Federal Reserve Bank located
entirely in Washington would be unduly influenced by Congress.104 The result was the creation
of regional banks located in several different metropolitan areas around the country.105
3. New Deal
Similar constitutional debates characterized the New Deal era. The diagnosis of what had
led to the Great Depression was a concentration of power in a few places in the country. The
creation of the administrative state over the several decades of the middle of the twentieth
century featured a comprehensive attempt to remedy perceived geographical concentrations.106
The administrative state would be a separate fourth branch, and that fourth branch would
sometimes need to place officials outside of Washington for it to be separate.
The period from the 1880’s until the 1920’s featured substantial growth in the federal
government in Washington107 and therefore the transformation of Washington itself.108 The
98
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Pendleton Act—which laid the foundations for the modern civil service—mentions often that
civil service officials will be concentrated in Washington.109 This concentration of federal power
in Washington was blamed for the easy capture of that federal power by business leaders
concentrated in and around Washington that led to the Great Depression.110
New Deal debates therefore debated decentralizing plans both big and small to produce a
new separation of places. Some argued that there needed to be what one advocate called “a
capital for the New Deal.”111 A front-page story in The New York Times Magazine summarized
the movement to move the entire capital to the Rocky Mountains.112 In the early 1950’s,
Representative Charles A. Buckley, a powerful committee chair in the House of Representatives,
tried to mitigate congressional opposition to new agencies and departments by proposing
legislation to decentralize many of them—as well as the Supreme Court and the Executive Office
of the President.113
While major decentralization efforts like this were defeated, the new administrative state
did feature smaller decentralizations. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the
“Brownlow Committee” to make suggestions about reorganizing the executive branch. As Elena
Kagan has argued, this Committee “established the infrastructure underlying all subsequent
attempts by the White House to supervise administrative policy.”114 The Brownlow Committee’s
ambition was for administrative agencies to “decentraliz[e] [so] that the Government servant
remains himself [is] one of the people in touch with the people and does not degenerate into an
isolated and arrogant bureaucrat.”115 Some offices were concentrated outside of Washington,
such as official efforts to control the spread of malaria (located in Atlanta in an early version of
the Centers for Disease Control). Others were headquartered in Washington but featured
regional offices throughout the United States.116
Still others were located outside of the central area of Washington, including most
significantly the emerging military infrastructure created by World War II and formalized after
108
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it.117 Ensuring separation between the military-intelligence apparatus and the executive branch
was an important design goal.118 But an entirely separate military-intelligence apparatus that was
in another metropolitan area would be too disconnected from the civilian executive leadership to
understand and follow their commands.
A compromise was reached: use the Washington suburbs in Virginia and Maryland.119
There were objections to this, particularly on constitutional grounds in the Senate.120 The
President argued that the Take Care Clause delegated him the power to decentralize when
necessary.121 Congress enacted a statute purporting to interpret the District Clause in Article I,
and to demonstrate the constitutionality of these decentralizations. The new law indicated that
the “district” identified in Article I as the capital would be defined by federal law as constituting
“the District of Columbia; Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties in Maryland; Arlington,
Fairfax, Loudoun, and Prince William Counties in Virginia; and all cities now or hereafter
existing in Maryland or Virginia within the geographic area bounded by the outer boundaries of
the combined area of said counties.”122 Congress argued that it was acting consistently with
Article I, and that the Washington metropolitan area was the contemporary version of the capital
of “ten miles square” specified in Article I.123 President John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon
later issued largely similar executive orders making decentralization within the executive branch
a federal legal priority.124
Congress also formalized its own decentralizing efforts during this period. Members of
Congress would themselves travel back and forth to their districts and states, but did not have a
substantial permanent presence outside of Washington. The common practice was for one small
office in the district or state.125 Since and because of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
and a similar statute in 1970, now members of Congress employ usually around half of their staff
in the district or state.126 The farther the member of Congress is from their district or state, the
greater the budget they receive to employ staff in their district or state.127
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4. The Second Reconstruction
Scholars have explained the decades after World War II as manifesting a substantial
increase in federal power, some of it in service of a Second Reconstruction trying to pursue
equality.128 In the sixty plus years after the New Deal and before United States v. Lopez129 in
1995, the Supreme Court never invalidated a law as exceeding Congress’s powers under the
Commerce Clause. The unusual facts of NFIB v. Sebelius provided the Court with an
opportunity to invalidate a law under the Spending Clause in ways it had never done so
previously.130 Even after NFIB, it is fair to label much of federalism more of the “puppy
federalism” than the real federalism variety.131
During this moment of increasing federal power, though, it is important to note how
much federal decentralization has still been a part of the constitutional landscape. The increase
in federal power has often featured efforts to mitigate that increase by decentralizing that federal
power. The civil rights movement featured dramatic federal interventions, but federal
interventions often defined by law as decentralized interventions. When President Dwight
Eisenhower ordered troops to enforce a desegregation order in Arkansas, and President John F.
Kennedy ordered troops to enforce a desegregation order in Alabama, they used federal officials
located in those states.132 The Constitution suggests that militias will be primarily state entities,
meaning they were primarily to be located within states.133 A series of federal statutes
(implementing constitutional language) provides that the President can federalize state militias
located in these states and turn them into federal officials in certain emergency situations.134 The
presidential executive orders in both situations specifically mentioned using those statutes and
therefore using troops located in those states.135 The federal judges ordering desegregation were
128
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often figures like Frank Johnson, a federal judge, but one from the South and located in the
South.136
Likewise, the cases that were to mark the return of power to state governments outside of
Washington revealed how much federal power was already outside of Washington. In Lopez,
Antonio Lopez was charged with a federal crime for carrying a concealed firearm near his high
school in San Antonio.137 The United States Attorney that made the decision to charge Lopez and
that handled his appeal through the lower federal courts was located in Texas.138 The district
court and court of appeals that affirmed the constitutionality of his conviction were both located
far outside of Washington.
5. Contemporary
The past few years have featured something of a critical juncture for federal
decentralization. The last years of the Obama Administration featured several major initiatives
to decentralize. Congress has considered bills sponsored by members of both parties
commanding major federal decentralizations. While so much of this activity is new, it is worth
considering how many of their arguments are still based in the same constitutionally-derived
concern with the separation of places that Madison and his colleagues articulated several
centuries ago.
First, the fact that places still generate and maintain different political communities
outside of Washington has been a big feature of the recent discussion about federal
decentralization. One of the pieces of legislation considered by Congress in 2017 makes specific
reference to the differences in political communities across places as the motivation to
decentralize.139 It is therefore notable that one important study found nearly 30 percent of
political appointees lived in the Washington metropolitan area at the time of their nomination.140
Congress created a label—Divest D.C.—to capture these reasons to increase federal
decentralization.141 During hearings in the House of Representatives about one legislative effort
to decentralize in 2017, for instance, Representative Rod Blum from Iowa noted that the
Department of Agriculture “impact[s]” farmers but that he has “yet to see a cow or hog in
Washington, D.C.”142
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Likewise, in the second term of the Obama Administration, officials in the White House
and the Department of Defense worried that the distinctive innovation transpiring in Silicon
Valley was not spilling over into insights in the federal government. As an Obama
Administration official stated, the worry was that federal policy related to technology was
captured by “the usual Washington contractors” instead of empowering innovators in Silicon
Valley.143 The Department of Defense therefore created an important new office in Silicon
Valley entitled Defense Innovation Unit—Experimental (“DIUx”).144 DIUx was designed to be
“far removed from the Beltway”145 and therefore generate more of a “bridge” with Silicon
Valley.146 DIUx would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.147 Because Boston has a
similarly sophisticated technology network, DIUx now has an office in Boston as well.148 Obama
Administration efforts extended to other agencies and departments, because of a similar concern
that what these separate agencies and departments require—and that administrative law
prioritizes—cannot be provided exclusively from Washington.
Second, a continuing motivation to decentralize federal power has been complimented by
greater opportunities to do so. The demand for federal decentralization has increased alongside
the cheaper supply of decentralized federal officials. At the turn of the twentieth century,
transportation costs were much more substantial than they would be just half a century later.149
The twenty largest metropolitan areas were all located on major waterways because access to
transportation was crucial for economic success.150 Centralization was often an obligation rather
than a choice. The creation of the combustion engine and the rise of airplane travel transformed
organizational structures.151
The rise of the Internet has only contributed to these trends. When Democratic
Representative Tim Ryan introduced his decentralization legislation in 2017, he indicated that it
was motivated by “the technology available to us today.”152 While it used to take two days to get
communication from New York to Washington, now it takes less than two seconds to
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communicate electronically between the places.153 The modern organizational form across the
private and public sectors is increasingly decentralized with specialized regional hubs.154 Large
organizations locate their finance offices in New York City, their lobbying offices in
Washington, and their technology offices in Silicon Valley.
Federal decentralization continues to be debated as a constitutional issue. During the
most extensive recent discussion of federal decentralization in Congress—in the House of
Representatives in the spring of 2017—several opponents of federal decentralization argued that
it would be unconstitutional to do so. One member stated “I’m sorry, everybody, the framers
decided — just like every other part of the world — there would be a capital and in the capital
would be located the major agencies that run your government.”155 Constitutional concerns even
led one Republican member of the House of Representatives to vote against their party and
oppose decentralization efforts.156 Supporters of decentralization efforts not only see it as
constitutionally possible, but constitutionally necessary.157
II.

The Tools of Federal Decentralization

This Part identifies the tools available to institutional designers interested in federal
decentralization. Federal decentralization is an umbrella term—similar to federalism and
separation of powers—in that it is used to describe many institutional practices.158 Unbundling
federal decentralization by identifying its component parts can generate greater analytical clarity.
Federal decentralization essentially asks two design questions: what is to be
decentralized, and how much is to be decentralized? The former question focuses on whether
decentralization will transpire across branches, within branches, or some combination of the two.
Once the target of decentralization is identified, the question is how much to decentralize that
target. The quantity of decentralization will itself turn on two sub-questions. (1) How many and
how important are the officials being decentralized? (2) How far away are these officials being
placed? Is the decentralization within the same metropolitan or in a different metropolitan area?
Is the other metropolitan area quite similar or quite different than the one locating other federal
officials?
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A. What to Decentralize
Federal decentralization can be motivated by the desire to diffuse power across branches
of the federal government and/or to diffuse power within branches of the federal government.
Scholars commonly differentiate between “external” separation of powers diffusing power
among the branches, and the “internal” separation of powers diffusing power within a branch.159
Federal decentralization likewise features decentralizations across branches in different
locations, or within branches in different locations. There is no logical inconsistency with both
being utilized, so that there is both internal and external decentralization.160
Federal decentralizations across the branches have been the most salient form of
decentralization. The West German system created after World War II placed the legislative and
executive branches in Bonn while the two chief courts were in Karlsruhe.161 The European
Union likewise has three capital cities housing three different branches of the government.162 The
South African Constitution specifies that “[t]he seat of Parliament is Cape Town.”163 Subsequent
legislation made Pretoria the executive capital and Bloemfontein the judicial capital.164 American
federal decentralization likewise features external decentralization, though nothing of the
magnitude of most other countries. The Evarts Act placed lower federal courts outside of
Washington in part to distance them from the legislative and executive branches in Washington.
The regional Federal Reserve Banks were placed outside of Washington to distance them from
the legislative and executive branches in Washington.
External decentralizations are primarily motivated by a concern that one branch has been
or could be unduly influenced by another branch. As James Madison wrote in Federalist 48,
“[i]t is equally evident, that none of the [branches] ought to possess, directly or indirectly, an
overruling influence over the others, in the administration of their respective powers.”165 It is
most common in comparative constitutional law to see the legislature and the executive colocated, and the judiciary located someplace differently. This was the West German approach,
and one that was widely copied. In the Czech Republic, for instance, the legislative and the
executive are in Prague but the Constitutional Court is located in Brno.166 The Supreme Court’s
entanglement with the other two branches in Brazil has generated proposals to move the Court to
Rio de Janiero from its current location in Brasilia.167 In some countries, the executive and the
judiciary are co-located, but concerns about the autonomy of the legislature are significant
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enough that the legislature is located in a different metropolitan area. In Chile, for instance,
Santiago is home to the executive branch and the judicial branch, and Valparaiso to the
legislative branch.168
The Supreme Court Justices in the United States rode circuit because of the concern that
judicial independence could not co-exist with judicial co-location with the executive and
legislative branches.169 Once the Justices centralized in Washington, decentralized lower federal
courts of appeals were created to ensure decentralized federal judges.170 Chief Justice William
Howard Taft viewed a separate building for the Supreme Court as on par with the Court having
control of its docket in its importance in producing an independent Supreme Court.171 Chief
Justice Taft’s arguments resembled those of many of the Framers worried about executive
power. For them, the legislative branch had to have its own building in Washington from the
moment the federal government moved to Washington if the legislature was to resist the
President.172
Internal decentralization is a more commonly used tool, particularly in the American
system. The desire to diffuse power within a branch motivates a decision to distance parts of a
branch. In West Germany, for instance, Cologne was marked as the location of the domestic
intelligence agency, while Pullach was the location of the foreign intelligence agency.173 The
Department of Treasury was located in a different building than the President at the Founding.174
Administrative agencies feature regional offices to diffuse power within the executive branch.175
B. How Much to Decentralize
The second question that institution-designers must answer is how much to decentralize.
It is a truism that decentralization will transpire; not every official can share the same office, or
the same floor, or the same building, or the same street, or the same Metro stop. The question
therefore is inevitable: what degree of decentralization is desired? Resolving this question
involves the consideration of two dimensions.
First, one feature of resolving the “how much” question is resolving how many federal
officials will be decentralized. In the American context, what is the number of federal officials
located outside of the central “ten miles square” that the American Constitution identifies as the
168
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core of the federal government?176 One historian has found that the American answer has been a
fairly constant answer—somewhere between 80 and 90 percent of federal officials have always
been located outside of Washington.177 The current bill before the House of Representatives
proposes something even more dramatic: moving at least 90 percent of administrative agency
staff outside of Washington.178
Another means of answering the question of how many federal officials are decentralized
is more qualitative than quantitative. How many of the most important federal officials are
located outside of Washington? In the United States, some—including President Ulysses
Grant179—have argued that important officials must be located in Washington as a matter of
federal constitutional and statutory law. Outside of debates about the District Clause in Article I,
many have made similar arguments about the greater importance of policy coordination among
the most important federal officials. The Constitution differentiates between more important
officials (principal) and less important officials (inferior).180 The Supreme Court as recently as
this past term in Ziglar v. Abassi stated that coordination of the most important officials (at least
in the executive branch) is a concern of the highest constitutional magnitude.181
A defining feature of American federal decentralization has therefore been its answer to
the qualitative part of the “how many” question more than its answer to the quantitative part.
American federal decentralization is essentially horizontal. If you want to know how important
an official is—a good portion of the time at least—look at where they are located. The most
important executive branch officials are near the President or cabinet heads, the most important
legislative branch officials are in the Speaker’s Office or nearby to it, and the most important
judicial branch officials are in the Supreme Court building. The Federal Reserve Bank in New
York City has an outsized importance, but one less than its counterpart in Washington does, just
as does the office of the Department of Health and Human Services in New York City.
This answer to the question of locating important officials distinguishes the American
approach from many comparative approaches, which are defined by their insistence that some of
the most important officials be decentralized. For instance, when the West German Basic Law
was drafted, it was said that “whoever took Berlin ruled Germany,” and the only means to
address that concern was to locate important officials elsewhere.182 The South African system
176
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was intended to ensure that factions around the country all felt invested in the federal
government, and this would have been impossible if all that was located in their home area was
an insignificant part of the federal government.183
Second, another feature of resolving the “how much” question is resolving how far these
decentralizations will be. The most relevant geographical unit in the United States now is the
metropolitan statistical area.184 It is still relatively costly to move people, particularly within
congested metropolitan areas (like Washington).185 The direct cost of spending time in traffic
traveling places can be substantial, and that time commuting generates major opportunity costs
because it is (as of now) largely wasted time.186 The result is that the “average number of local
interactions per person . . . is affected by their spatial distance.”187
This intra-metropolitan decentralization is significant enough as a structural feature to be
constitutionalized in other countries. The Tunisian Constitution purposefully places parts of the
Tunisian government outside of the center of Tunis but still within the same metropolitan area.188
Bardo, a suburb of Tunis, features important governmental offices.189 There are certainly salient
examples of purposefully decentralized federal offices within the Washington metropolitan area.
The decision to locate the Department of Homeland Security in Tenleytown in more suburban
upper northwest Washington D.C. was done to find a middle ground between the centralization
of other parts of the executive branch in downtown Washington and the decentralization
provided by suburban Virginia and Maryland.190
Decentralizing within a metropolitan area can have some substantial effects, but often not
as much as decentralizing across metropolitan areas. The greater costs incurred in transporting
individuals across metropolitan areas will reduce the exposure of officials in one metropolitan
area to the argument pools and the reputational oversight of another metropolitan area. The
decision to place the regional Federal Reserve Banks not just in another part of Washington, but
in other parts of the country is reflective of this distance as difference mechanism.
Inter-metropolitan federal decentralizations will also vary in the magnitude of its effects.
Metropolitan areas vary in their degree of connection to the rest of the country, and in their
degree of similarity to other metropolitan areas. Compare the relative ease of going from the
183
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Federal Reserve Bank in Washington to the one in Chicago than it is the one in Kansas.191 A
federal official located in Kansas will be more decentralized in practice than one located in
Chicago. The political scientists Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw have found
meaningful differences in political preferences across metropolitan areas, with Oklahoma City
being the metropolitan area on the other ideological end of the spectrum from Washington.192 A
federal official located in Oklahoma City will be more decentralized than one located in New
York City.
Some locations cannot even be classified as equally metropolitan in the first place.
Metropolitan areas are defined by their populations (a core urban area of over 50,000) and their
commuting patterns (surrounding areas connected to that core urban area are included within the
metropolitan area).193 Within metropolitan areas, though, there are major variations. It has
different implications to locate a federal office in suburban Tysons Corner than in downtown
Washington.194 It has different implications to locate a federal office outside of a metropolitan
area altogether. Placing a federal official in Keene, New York (population 1,105) is different
than placing them in Albany, New York (population 1.1 million) or in New York City, New
York (population 8.2 million).
III.

Implications

Federal decentralization provides normative relief to federalism and the separation of
powers. No longer is each doctrine responsible for providing fifty percent of the diffusion
constitutional law requires—half of the “double security” that James Madison mentioned.195
Federal decentralization supplies part of the diffusion that constitutional law demands, and that
federalism and separation of powers are incapable of providing.
Federalism can only provide the voice that local majorities need if local majorities are
sometimes speaking to federal officials from across the street—or if local majorities are speaking
as federal officials. Separation of powers can only provide the competing “ambition[s]”196 that
pits the branches against one another if officials in these branches can sometimes exit to different
parts of the country. The additional diffusion that federal decentralization provides, though,
requires careful calibration to ensure that there are forces sufficiently centripetal in nature as
well. As part of this analysis, this Part provides new reads on two of the most significant areas
of constitutional law: commandeering and executive power.
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A. Federalism
Federalism, as Heather Gerken has written, diffuses power to state governments outside
of Washington to “allow[s] national minorities to constitute local majorities.”197 Existing
discussions of federalism rely heavily on state governments and citizens far from Washington to
persuade, cajole and even coerce the federal government in Washington to protect local
majorities. Interactions by federal officials in Washington with those outside of Washington
every few days or every few months—or with voters outside of Washington every two, four or
six years—are presumed to provide sufficient voice to those local majorities. Federal officials
that are distant and different from these local majorities will inevitably undersupply
decentralization. Federal decentralization integrates local majorities into the federal government
in a way ensuring that these local majorities have voice in a more consistent way.
The power of federal decentralization also generates perils for federalism. If federal
decentralization is so effective it can pose some risk of not just complimenting federalism but
substituting for it. From the other perspective, federal decentralization added to federalism can
generate excessive (rather than efficient) diffusion. This Part provides an initial discussion of
how institution-designers have addressed concerns about federal decentralization.
1. Design
a. Benefits
Courts and commentators have constantly debated how to empower local majorities.
Virtually every vision of empowering local majorities involves empowering state officials
because local majorities have cheaper access to state officials. As the Supreme Court said in
Gregory v. Ashcroft, state government is “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous
society” because it features more “opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes.”198 Courts and commentators have therefore often focused on ensuring both that local
majorities have voice within state government and that local majorities have voice in the federal
government by virtue of their voice in state government and the influence state officials have
over federal officials.
The sovereignty model has focused on ensuring that state governments have discrete
areas of policy that they can administer.199 Because local majorities have a voice in state
government, their perspectives will be represented when state governments legislate in certain
areas protected as state domains. Process federalists argue that institutions like political
parties—heavily compromised of state and local officials located outside of Washington—
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convince those in Washington to respect local majorities.200 Cooperative and uncooperative
federalists argue that state and local governments outside of Washington enforcing—or declining
to enforce—federal law convince those in Washington to respect local majorities.201
Each of these accounts of federalism, though, inevitably limits local majorities because
local majorities are distant from—and therefore more limited by—federal officials. The
sovereignty model presumes that a federal government concentrated in Washington will
adequately consider and internalize the interests of distant and different local majorities. A
Supreme Court dominated by Washington-based Supreme Court advocates appearing before it202
and Justices whose Washington experiences shape their decisions,203 though, cannot be
sufficiently sensitized to local majorities. As Justice Antonin Scalia wrote about the Supreme
Court in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges, “[f]our of the nine [Justices] are natives of New
York City. Eight of them grew up in east- and west-coast States. Only one halls from the vast
expanse in-between.”204
Other visions of protecting local majorities focus on giving local majorities voice not just
in their state governments, but in ensuring that state governments have voice in federal
deliberations.205 The brilliant framing of the literature by Heather Gerken—about the power of
the servant—captures the limitations of using those outside of Washington to shape federalism
inside of Washington. Federalism limits the ability of local majorities to influence the far more
200
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important federal government—a federal government that has the Supremacy Clause at its
disposal—if state governments are distant from federal power.206 The expansion of the country
since the Founding means that Washington is no longer “nearer the centre than any part” of the
country, as James Madison praised Washington as being when he spoke about this during the
First Congress.207 Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 14 that the American Republic will
cease to be a democracy when federal power was so far away from the people that they could not
easily access federal power anymore.208
The citizen outside of Washington faces a “make or buy” decision in terms of political
influence,209 but a decision in which either making or buying influence is costly. If local citizens
decide to influence federal officials themselves, they must endure the direct costs of traveling to
Washington to interact with the most important federal officials. Infrequent interactions like the
occasional visit will be ineffective as compared to the benefits of repeat player, constant
interactions.210 Republicans and Democrats alike, for instance, have complained that President
Trump has been inaccessible because he has rarely traveled West of the Mississippi River.211
Local citizens can more cheaply influence more proximate state or local officials, and
then hope that these state or local officials in turn influence more powerful federal officials.
However, federal officials are often located far away from and are therefore are not particularly
close to state or local officials anyway.212 Citizens living closer to Washington, by contrast, can
more easily access federal power. Nearly one in three residents of the District of Columbia have
directly protested the Trump Administration since President Trump was inaugurated in January
of 2017.213
Alternatively, local citizens can purchase services from those inside of Washington
specializing in accessing federal power. There is a form of lobbying “market depth” in
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Washington since branches are concentrated there.214 Large numbers of individuals in
Washington can specialize in walking through the revolving door in and out of government
because there are many employment opportunities in which to utilize human capital related to the
federal government. This even plays out on a street-by-street basis in Washington. K Street in
Washington is the center of the political influence industry because it is located proximately to
the primary locations of power for each of the three branches of government.215 Rents on K
Street are therefore enormous because of the greater access this physical proximity to so much
power provides.216 Local interests—such as state governments—are important consumers
purchasing these influence services, but purchasing these services is quite expensive.217
Consider the enactment of the Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act (“ACA”) in
2010. Scholars rightly made much of the fact that the ACA was respectful of federalism.218 The
Medicaid expansion was enacted through the Spending Clause, meaning that state governments
had to willfully accept federal money and would act cooperatively (or uncooperatively) in the
implementation of the expansion. State governments even applied creative labels to frame their
Medicaid expansion as being decentralized, using titles like “TennCare” (Tennessee) and “Husky
Health” (Connecticut).219
Despite these best and impressive efforts, though, the Medicaid expansion faced criticism
for being excessively centralized. A citizen in Tennessee could complain directly to their health
department about the conditions applied on Medicaid funds, but many of these conditions were
imposed by Washington officials hundreds of miles away.220 The citizen could travel to
Washington or hire a lobbying firm in Washington to lobby the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) to remedy these conditions, but not many citizens can, let alone on a
regular enough basis to be effective.
By contrast, federal decentralization makes local majorities into neighbors of federal
officials, rather than servants to them. Neighbors have more voice than servants. Federal
officials hear more and hear better about the concerns of locals once they live amongst them, and
come to care more about addressing these concerns. Empirical studies of federal agency
214
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behavior in agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)—agencies with
substantial regional offices—have found regional variation among agency behavior. Agency
behavior varied across regions because EPA officials learned about local needs more efficiently
and more quickly from across the street rather than across the country, and adapted their
regulatory behavior accordingly.221
Local majorities also can become federal officials, rather than just neighbors influencing
them. Federal and state offices that are co-located generate market depth in that particular policy
area.222 Individuals can specialize in a policy area and know that there are ample opportunities in
that policy area that do not require enduring the costs of relocation to realize these opportunities.
Local citizens can therefore go between federal and state offices, rather than having to stay local
and work for the state government or go national by moving to Washington to work for the
federal government.
The result is a class of federal and state officials with unique capacities to mediate
between federal and state power and ensure that both are respected. Federal officials, like other
professionals, develop human capital related to their earliest professional experiences.223 Federal
officials early in their career learn how to harmonize the interests of those outside of Washington
with the interests of those inside of Washington in a fashon that will persist later in one’s career.
House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy from California, for instance, served in the California
office of Representative Bill Thomas earlier in his career. From that early experience, he gained
an understanding of the interests of that part of California, an understanding that he has carried
with him during his time now serving in the Congress in Washington.224 State and local officials
likewise develop the capacity to resist federal power more effectively when they earlier
exercised federal power from the same place that they exercise state or local power. Bill De
Blasio was the regional head of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in New
York City during the Clinton Administration, and that assisted his negotiations with the federal
government on behalf of New York City once he became mayor. 225
Citizens appreciate this federal decentralization as more respectful of local majorities.
Federal decentralization makes local majorities think that the federal government understands
them. The most popular federal agencies are the ones that are the most decentralized—the
221
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United States Postal Service, the National Parks Service, and the Centers for Disease Control.226
Consider how meaningful it was to the Tea Party activists during the summer of 2009 and the
Democratic Party activists during the summer of 2017 that that were able to meet with their
members of Congress when they returned home to their districts and states.227
Federal decentralization therefore supplements the pursuit of many of the institutional
ambitions of federalism. State governments have faced a “pretty inexorable expansion of
national power vis-à-vis the States over the past two centuries” because of their incapacity to
resist federal power from outside of the federal government.228 A federal government more
sensitive to local majorities or even employing them “does not exercise lightly” its Supremacy
Clause power to disregard local majorities.229 If the federal government excessively introduces
on local majorities, local majorities have a cheap and effective means of addressing their
grievances to the federal government.
Federal decentralization also supplements the pursuit of policy experimentation. Since
Justice Louis Brandeis argued that federalism permits states to “try novel social and economic
experiments,”230 ensuring that power is located outside of Washington has been part of ensuring
that policy innovation transpires. Innovations generally require higher and more specialized
levels of human capital in the particular issue domains where the innovation could be
generated.231 Economists have noted that this labor specialization needed to innovate is
geographically distributed.232 Federal decentralization empowers those outside of Washington to
innovate by granting them greater returns for innovating by granting them federal powers to
innovate. Federally decentralized innovation is innovation that immediately has the Supremacy
Clause behind it. A policy innovation from within the federal government can bind large parts
of the country or the entire country, and not just a single state. The returns to innovations are
also greater because they will diffuse faster with the more salient federal imprimatur behind
them, shaping the behavior of other federal—as well as state—officials.
b. Costs
Federal decentralization could pose threats to federalism if it is either too successful or
insufficiently successful. If it is too successful, federalism might not just be as a partial but a
226
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perfect substitute for federalism. The result is either federal decentralization or federalism.
While in Germany federal decentralization coexists with federalism, in South Africa federal
decentralization largely substitutes for it.233 Talented localized human capital could be attracted
to the greater policy returns generated by a federal office empowered with the Supremacy
Clause234 and the greater financial returns from federal as compared to state employment.235
There are reasons to doubt that federal decentralization could ever truly substitute for
federalism. The market for decentralized power is elastic. Labor markets are notably elastic,
pulling and pushing talented people into new and different places as desirable employment
opportunities exist.236 If a location delivers significant policy returns, then that could encourage
more regulation from that location of both a state and federal variety, and therefore enough
employment opportunities to attract enough talent to staff both federal and state efforts.
Consider, for instance, the intervention of the Department of Defense into Silicon Valley. The
State of California maintains important offices in Silicon Valley, and the Patent and Trademark
Office has had an important office there for some time.237 There could still be enough local
human capital to staff Defense Department initiatives.
Federal decentralization is also analytically distinct from federalism in important ways
that would preclude one from ever perfectly substituting for the other. Federal decentralization
provides the federal government with greater control over the actions of local majorities. Local
majorities are the agents of principals in Washington. If a United States Senator does not like
how their staff in Anchorage is behaving, they can fire them. By contrast, federalism limits the
control the federal government has over the actions of local majorities. Federal officials cannot
commandeer local officials,238 and if they wish to displace state action they often must endure
Bicameralism and Presentment and pass legislation—never an easy thing to do.239
Federal decentralization also creates a risk in the opposite direction: the threat of
excessive decentralization. Washington was made the seat of government because officials
working there—a city without a state—would shed some of their state allegiances.240 If federal
233
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officials shed the experience of investing in a national place, will the federal government and
state governments be dominated by local majorities?
Institution-designers confronting this issue have found several mechanisms effective in
addressing this concern. If federal and state officials generate strong ties in a decentralized
location, these ties can produce efficient bargains between the two, rather than the federal official
abandoning his or her federal concerns for purely local ones.241 Federal decentralization has
sometimes utilized something like the “principle of subsidiarity” that is common in the
constitutional law of many countries.242 Some policy domains work better when centralized.
Constitutional law has traditionally ranked foreign policy as one of those areas,243 and recent
congressional legislation to decentralize has largely exempted foreign policy and national
security from its coverage.244 For policy domains where the risks of excessive diffusion are
greatest, then, federal decentralization can be more limited.
2. Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine has missed the voice the federal
decentralization provides. The Court has therefore invalidated statutes for depriving local
majorities of their voice without considering how local majorities had voice through proximity to
federal power rather than just distant opposition to it. The Court also has not generated a
analytical toolkit to help understand when federal decentralization overwhelms local voice rather
than supporting it.
The Supreme Court has stated that the “[f]ederal [g]overnment may not compel the States
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”245 The essence of this constitutional
problem is that local majorities do not have enough voice. Federal policies “force” state officials
to do things, thereby depriving local majorities of the ability to elect and evaluate their own
officials.246 Compulsion is much less likely to transpire, though, when federal officials are
working together with state officials from across the street rather than working against them from
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across the country. Federal decentralization amplifies voice in a way that calls into question the
coercion at the center of the Court’s anti-commandeering cases.247
The assumption in many federalism cases—including the anti-commandeering cases—is
that the federal government only acts centrally and therefore coercively on local majorities, and
that state and local governments act locally and therefore consensually involving local
majorities. In New York v. United States, the majority did contemplate federal decentralization,
assuming that only “state governments” could act as “regional offices of the Federal
Government.”248 Justice Byron White, joined by Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul
Stevens, wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that a federal statute
involved “imposing a solution from Washington.”249
This assumption of centralized federal power permits the Court to frame federal action as
depriving local majorities of voice. If federal officials are located distantly from and thereby
disconnected from local interests, then local interests did not have their voices heard in the
federal process producing the federal policy. In New York, the Court noted that “the residents of
the State [must] retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply” with
federal policies.250 The “residents of the State” could only influence “elected state officials.”251
Federal officials, by contrast, were presumed not to be “responsive to the local electorate’s
preferences.”252
Federal decentralization provides local majorities with federal voice in a way that
mitigates these concerns that local majorities were coerced. The Court in New York was
concerned that federal officials would not understand “local interests.”253 Federal officials
located proximately to local residents are participating in the same argument pools, thereby
hearing the voices of locals about local interests. New York assumes that it will be “state
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised
the regulatory program may remain insulated.”254 Federal officials located within local
communities fear the disapproval of those communities. The costs of disapproval can include
the loss of personal relationships within the community. The costs can also include the
destruction of crucial local professional relationships. Many decentralized federal officials trade
on their good name locally to seek future professional opportunities. Consider current New York
City Mayor Bill De Blasio, who used his stint in the regional office of the Department of
247
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Housing and Urban Development to help launch his successful campaign for Mayor of New
York City.255
Rather than undermining the entire doctrine of anti-commandeering, federal
decentralization suggests that we look to the specifics of the policies being questioned to see if
these policies were crafted featuring enough local federal voice. Consider, for instance, the
recent lawsuits brought against the Trump Administration for its executive order to cut federal
funding to so-called sanctuary cities.256 The Trump Administration issued its executive order
after consulting primarily with lawyers in the White House and a few select lawyers in Justice
Department headquarters. There was little opportunity for substantial local engagement.257
Given those facts, the Supreme Court could reasonably doubt whether local officials were being
coerced, as local officials were not being heard during the process leading up to the executive
order.
B. Separation of Powers
The separation of powers requires that “opposite and rival interests”258 control different
branches of the federal government. These rivalrous interests ensure that no one individual or
party pushes the federal government to extremes by ensuring that competing perspectives are
represented within the federal government. Two approaches have dominated modern doctrinal
approaches to producing rivalrous interests with federal power: formalism and functionalism.259
With all of their differences, though, both formalists and functionalists examine how federal
officials are selected and how they are empowered as the primary constitutional tools to generate
difference among the branches of the federal government.260 There is no account of where
federal officials operate once selected and empowered.
Federal decentralization supplements separation of powers by adding another mechanism
to ensure that power is sufficiently diffused among and within branches. It provides the constant
exit necessary to ensure the requisite back and forth between branches and offices.261 Federal
decentralization also risks over separating powers, so this Section theorizes institutional designs
that have been used to minimize diffusion risks. This account is made more concrete by
highlighting constitutional doctrines that find federal policies problematic without considering
the important role that federal decentralization plays in their operation.
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1. Design
a. Benefits
The separation of powers features different mechanisms to ensure that rivalrous interests
are generated across and within the branches of the federal government. As Steven Calabresi has
written, a common defense of the separation of powers is that it is “more sophisticated in its
mechanisms for sampling the Popular Will.”262 The three branches of government each represent
different constituencies and are selected at different times. Once in office, these federal officials
are granted different powers in the first three Articles of the Constitution. The result is meant to
be heterogeneity across and within the branches at all times.
While federal officials are selected by many different places and at many different times,
if all of them then go to the same location voters elsewhere face inevitable agency costs in
monitoring them. Voters are less likely to pay attention to those farther from them.263
Information travels less well across greater distances.264 Meanwhile, officials are immersed in
the networks of another location for the majority of their time in office. Federal officials across
the branches are exposed to the same argument pools in Washington.265 When branches are colocated officials face greater incentives to invest in their reputations with officials across the
branches. A positive reputation in another branch of government can lead to greater influence in
one’s current branch.266 A positive reputation in other branches generates future employment
opportunities in other branches.267 Investments in relationships across the branches can also
generate returns from lucrative employment in the private sector premised on credible
commitments to clients of access to all branches of the federal government.268

262

Steven G. Calabresi, Why Professor Ackerman is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18
CONST. COMMENT. 51, 57 (2001). For similar arguments, see Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 564-65 (1998).
263
For information about this “friends and neighbors” effect, see, for instance, Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan &
Joseph Snipp, Local Sources of Information and Voter Choice in State Elections: Microlevel Foundations of the
“Friends and Neighbors” Effect, 21 AM. POL. Q. 473 (1993); Seth C. McKee & Jeremy M. Teigen, Probing the
Reds and Blues: Sectionalism and Voter Location in the 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections, 28 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 484 (2009).
264
See Bettencourt, supra note 187, at 1439 (“[The] average number of local interactions per person. . . is affected
by their spatial distance”).
265
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 78 (2000) (“What
other people do, or say, carries an informational externality.”)
266
Sarah A. Binder & Frances E. Lee, Making Deals in Congress, in SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN
AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily, ed., 2015). See, e.g., Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Second Chance for
“Obamacare” Repeal. And for Reince Priebus, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2017, at A1 (describing the “too-cozy
relationship” between Speaker Paul D. Ryan and the White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus).
267
See, e.g., Jason Horowitz, Antony Blinken Steps Into the Spotlight with Obama Administration Role, WASH.
POST, Sept. 15, 2013, at A1 (describing how former Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken obtained important
positions in the executive branch by using his work in as a Senate aide to “become close to . . . . integral part of a
small circle of national security experts, including [Jose[h] Biden, [Thomas] Donilon, his deputy Denis McDonough
and counterterrorism chief John Brennan [in the executive branch]”).
268
Consider, for instance, Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Breyer was a clerk on the United States Supreme Court,
an important staffer in the Senate, and through both efforts built relationships with those who served in the executive
branch as well. See Gwen Ifill, The Supreme Court; President Chooses Breyer, An Appeals Judge in Boston, For
Blackmun’s Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, at A1 (“[Breyer] already has bipartisan support in the Senate,

38

Federal Decentralization

Branches, in other words, face incentives to converge towards a more finite number of
ideological positions than are reflected in the many different types of ideological positions
present in the United States. The 2016 presidential election made clear to many Americans what
political scientists had been demonstrating for some time: on some issue dimensions federal
officials across the parties are more like one another than they are like the rest of the country.
The “Washington consensus”—note the name—extolled the virtues of free trade across the
borders of nation-states. Federal officials across both parties in Washington were and are largely
supportive of free trade across borders, while the rest of the country was much more skeptical.269
Federal officials based in Washington would only hear a limited number of anti-trade arguments,
and would be concerned about pleasing their colleagues and neighbors who were skeptical of
anti-trade arguments.
On issues that federal officials do differ across the parties within Washington—such as
abortion or affirmative action—their differences in Washington are still bimodal rather than a
reflection of the many ideal points that predominate throughout the country.270 When power is
unified in a single political party, there is a substantial risk of the federal government acting
without constraint.271 This is partially because the centralized parts of a party are those most
likely to urge the party to proceed forward without considering the party in opposition. When
power is divided among the two political parties, there is a substantial risk of the federal
government not acting enough at all. This is because the centralized parts of a party are those
most likely to urge the party to proceed forward without compromising with the party in
opposition.
Offices or branches within the federal government meant to be independent so as to
constrain power face more challenges being independent from across the street. The Supreme
Court is meant to be independent from the other branches of the federal government.272 Other
offices within the federal government, such as inspectors general, are likewise meant to be
independent so that they can constrain other actors.273 When these independent actors operate
primarily in Washington, they are exposed to the same argument pools as those in the other
branches and offices they are meant to be reviewing. These shared argument pools are more
than just abstract, but are often transmitted by law clerks (for courts) or lawyers (for inspectors
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general) who arrive at their positions in independent offices from their work across town with
those who they are supposed to be constraining.
Independent actors have incentives to care about their reputations with other branches
across town. Justices want to place their law clerks in important positions in the legislative and
executive branches. Lower federal court judges will sometimes leave to join the other branches
(think of Abner Mikva, a judge on the D.C. Circuit, who left to work as the White House
Counsel for President Clinton).274 Lawyers in inspector general offices leave their positions to
work elsewhere in the legislative or executive branches.275 Empirical studies have documented
how this influences the behavior of the Supreme Court Justices.276 Other federal courts located
in Washington also tend to feature judges with the same backgrounds and the same networks as
those in the other two branches of government and so are less inclined to constrain them.277
Federal decentralization generates more forces diffusing power to mitigate any concerns
about accumulations of power. It ensures that federal officials exit from Washington to expose
them to more argument pools and to place them in different reputational networks. In an era of
increasingly coherent and polarized political parties, almost everyone can be classified as
affiliating with one of the two political parties.278 The sorting of our polarized era means that
essentially all liberals are Democrats and all conservatives are Republicans.279 This does not
mean that all Democrats are equally liberal, nor does it mean that all Republicans are equally
conservative. There is variation within the parties, and this intra-party variation is often
geographically distributed.280 Empowering decentralized officials from within the same party can
generate cross-cutting ideological pressures across and within the branches regardless of whether
the branches are controlled by the same parties or different parties.
Decentralizing federal officials also ensures rivalrous interests not just because federal
officials are distant from those they serve, but also because these officials are not at all or equally
concentrated. Political behavior in dense locations is different than political behavior in more
sparsely populated locations like rural areas or suburban areas.281 Concentrations of individuals
also develop their own unique properties that differentiate them even from other concentrations.
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Agglomeration gains from being proximately located to other financial professionals in New
York City are different than agglomeration gains from being proximately located to other
technology professionals in Silicon Valley. Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw have
found significant differences in political behavior across metropolitan areas.282 Rather than all
metropolitan areas being the same, federal officials in Washington even across the branches will
not represent the perspectives of those in other metropolitan areas as well.
Federal decentralization not only helps produce the constraint that rivalrous interests
produce, but also the competence that separation of powers is meant to encourage.283 Generating
effective administration in a singular location generates substantial costs. Washington does not
have the market depth in many industries.284 Officials therefore make their careers in the federal
government without the exposure to leading technocrats in many industries and the knowledge
spillovers that would result from those industries.285 During congressional hearings in 2017
considering federal decentralization, one Republican member of Congress from Iowa noted the
technical deficits facing federal officials regulating agriculture by virtue of the fact that they are
never regulating from near “a corn plant or a soybean plant.”286
Officials can be relocated from elsewhere to Washington to provide this technical
expertise, but this can be costly. The technology stalwart from Silicon Valley relocating to
Washington to serve in the federal government endures opportunity costs. Being in Washington
means their relationships with other technology stalwarts will wither from a distance, or will
never commence in the first place.287 Being in Washington means the official will not benefit
from the continued knowledge spillovers of co-location with other technology stalwarts.288
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These costs can be greater because Washington does not have competing industries to
supplement for lost industry-specific investments from relocation to Washington. Benefits
forsaken by departing a past location are not remunerated through gains in Washington. There
are the exceptional industries that have sufficient market depth in Washington to provide
compensating industry returns in Washington—for instance, those working on medical research
at the National Institutes of Health.289 The federal government must endure all of these costs
generated via relocation by either compensating relocating officials with substantial monetary
and/or policy returns, or simply cannot lure enough of the officials it needs.
Federal decentralization permits the federal government to employ talented officials in
their natural habitats. Federal power is granted to those with technical expertise in the places
that helped them cultivate that technical expertise. Federal officials need not compensate these
officials for relocating away from the home base of their technical expertise.
b. Costs
Federal decentralization poses the opposite risk of federalism. If a rough generalization
can be made that federal decentralization could substitute for federalism, federal decentralization
could overpower separation of powers. The separation of places has been viewed by some as
adding another vetogate to an already constrained federal system.290 It is more difficult for
officials to coordinate policy action from across the country than from across the street. The
argument is then that the separation of powers generates too many vetogates on federal action,
particularly during periods of divided government, but even during periods of unified
government.291 Many of the Tea Party supporters of federal decentralization have embraced this
claim that federal decentralization generates another vetogate as accurate and as more virtue than
vice.292 There are reasons to be skeptical that federal decentralization always constrains more,
and that this additional constraint is always undesirable.
.
First, it is unclear if policy coordination is positively, negatively or simply uncorrelated
with decentralization. Federal decentralization certainly reduces how much government-specific
human capital federal officials possess. Political scientists have found that federal officials with
close relationships across the branches are more effective at getting things done.293 Federal
decentralization undermines these relationships and the knowledge about how to get things done
in government that comes from them by placing federal officials in different locations. The
cyber-terrorism official located in Silicon Valley will not learn as much about how the federal
289
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appropriations process operates, or how to get regulations through the Department of Defense, as
the cyber-terrorism official in Washington will.
Policy coordination could also be positively correlated with federal decentralization
because policy coordination benefits from specialized expertise. Federal decentralization
increases the capacity to understand what government should do, albeit at the cost of the capacity
to understand how to do it. Federal decentralization increases policy spillovers for federal
officials by placing them near specialized labor markets outside of Washington. The cyberterrorism official located in the Department of Defense office in Silicon Valley, for instance, will
learn more about technology from more interactions with those in the industry there. Greater
technical understanding about cyber-security can lead to better tools to ensure cyber-security,
and the additional value of these tools can overcome any costs derives from reduced knowledge
of how government works.
The policy expertise generating more action can be supplemented by the generative
function of distance. Geographical distance can facilitate the kind of critical distance and fresh
perspective-taking that can both stimulate new ideas and lower the temperature with those one
must work with in order to transformative these ideas into reality.294 When President Obama met
with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 2013, for instance, the meeting was purposefully held in
California to generate new ideas for cooperation and distance from officials who might
undermine cooperation.295
Federal decentralization can and has attempted to resolve this agglomeration tradeoff—
not always or even necessarily mostly successfully—in one or both of two ways. First, it can
endure the tradeoff as worthwhile for some class of federal officials. When the need for
technical expertise outweighs the need for knowledge of government, then locations outside of
Washington can be relatively more desirable. Knowledge of the congressional appropriations
process might not be terribly important for a computer scientist interested in preventing Russian
hacking to know, but it can be very important for a member of the White House Office of
Domestic Policy to know. Contemporary congressional legislation to decentralize federal power
has focused on national security officials in particular as those that benefit from knowledge of
how the federal government operates.296
Federal decentralization can balance technical expertise and governmental expertise by
creating several governmental cities. Economists have long noted the logic leading to
metropolitan areas specializing in discrete areas of human capital.297 This logic can justify the
creation of several company towns besides just Washington, and company towns specializing in
294
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a particular policy area. Think, again, of the cyber-terrorism official in the Department of
Defense in Silicon Valley. If officials working on those issues from across the federal
government were relocated to Silicon Valley, the policy/governmental knowledge spillover
tradeoff would not be as significant. The market depth of technology jobs would mean that
officials there have the incentive to invest in that particular policy expertise. The market depth
for governmental jobs means that officials there are benefitting from informational spillovers
about how the federal government operates from the many other federal officials located in the
same place.
This logic is often utilized in practice in other countries. South Africa, for instance, has a
judicial capital with a deep market for legal positions, an executive capital with a deep market
for executive positions, and a legislative capital with a deep market for legislative positions.298
The primary governmental cities in the United States now outside of Washington already use this
approach. Metropolitan areas like Colorado Springs and Virginia Beach have many military
officials, officials whose expertise combines military policy and how to run and operate within a
federal office.299 Clarksburg, West Virginia has become the primary location specializing in a
number of important investigative tasks performed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.300
Second, policy coordination is not always the ambition of the separation of powers. As
Heather Gerken has written, there are “two competing accounts” of separation of powers, one
dependent on “independence” and one dependent on “integration and interdependence.”301
Federal decentralization provides institution-designers with the opportunity to achieve
“independence” and not just achieve “integration and interdependence.” Judicial independence,
for instance, is the opposite of policy coordination. The “independence” part of separation of
powers is enhanced rather than undermined by federal decentralization. When Justices
coordinate too much with those they are reviewing, we see this as constitutionally problematic,
Revelations of the policy coordination between Justice Abe Fortas and President Lyndon B.
Johnson related to the Vietnam War, for instance, were sufficient to derail Fortas’s nomination to
become Chief Justice.302
2. Doctrine
In the past several years, the Supreme Court and several lower courts have issued
decisions expressing concerns that the President is losing control of the executive branch.303
Opponents of presidential power have expressed the opposite concern, arguing that presidential
power needs to be limited more rather than less.304 Both sides, though, are missing the point.
Without considering where executive power is located, it is impossible for constitutional doctrine
298
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to decide how much of that executive power the President controls. Indeed, the economists
Alberto Ades and Edward Glaeser have found that greater geographical concentrations of power
around the world have a causal relationship with autocratic executives.305 Only when agency
officials exit Washington can they truly be free “to some degree” of presidential control.306
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, the Supreme Court
invalidated the parts of a congressional statute authorizing removal of members of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) only for cause and only by Commissioners of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (themselves only removable by the President under
limited circumstances).307 Relying on similar logic as Free Enterprise Fund, the D.C. Circuit
recently invalidated one of the signature initiatives of the Obama Administration, the creation of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).308 CFPB is “an independent agency
headed not by a multi-member commission but rather by a single Director” removable only for
cause.309
These cases are ultimately about a single principle: administrative agencies cannot “slip
from the Executive’s control.”310 Executive branch officials must be “accountable” to the
President.311 Executive branch officials located in Washington will always be more accountable
to the President. The behavior of agency officials is easier for the President to monitor from
across the street or across town because information about agency behavior will travel more
quickly and more precisely from closer rather than from farther.312 Agency officials are less
likely to stray from the President’s regulatory preferences because they are hearing the same
universe of arguments about desirable regulatory actions as the President is. Agency officials are
also concerned about their reputations within the same networks as the President and the
President’s key staff, the networks that will shape their personal and professional futures.
Paradoxically, then, the recent cases invalidating federal statutes are misdirected because
those federal statutes feature uniquely geographically concentrated officials. The Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) framed as beyond presidential control in
Free Enterprise Fund is relatively geographically concentrated in Washington, with few regional

305

Alberto F. Ades & Edward L. Glaeser, Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban Giants, 110 Q.J. ECON. 195, 195
(1995) (“Dictatorships have central cities that are, on average, 50 percent larger than their democratic
counterparts.”).
306
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (stating that as acceptable level of official separation from the
President).
307
Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
308
P.H.H., 839 F.3d at 12-13.
309
Id. at 14.
310
Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 499. See also P.H.H., 839 F.3d at 12 (“In order to maintain control over the
exercise of executive power and take care that the laws are faithfully executed, the President must be able to
supervise and direct those subordinate executive officers.”). See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90
(1988) (“The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories of those officials who
may or may not be removed at will by the President,” but rather asks whether, given the ‘functions of the officials in
question,’ a removal provision “interfere[s] with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’”).
311
Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 483.
312
See Bettencourt, supra note 187, at 1439 (“[The] average number of local interactions per person. . . is affected
by their spatial distance”).

45

Federal Decentralization
officials of any importance.313 Its Board of Directors and key enforcement staff are dominated by
those whose careers have been made in Washington and who therefore share the same networks
as the presidential staff overseeing them.314
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) framed as beyond presidential
control in PHH is likewise relatively geographically concentrated, although less so than PCAOB.
When CFPB was created in 2010, its initial location across the street from the White House was
quite controversial because of the amount of presidential control it generated. Elizabeth Warren,
the intellectual architect of CFPB, praised the proximity as indicating that CFPB was “to have a
very tangible presence” in the White House.315 A prominent opponent to CFPB from the House
of Representatives criticized CFPB’s proximity to the White House as undermining its
independence from the White House.316 The most important officials in CFPB’s earliest years
have been high-powered Washington lawyers with experience in and with the executive branch,
many of whom (like Warren) performed well enough at CFPB that they were able to obtain
opportunities in other branches (including in the Obama White House). CFPB features regional
offices, but the D.C. Circuit viewed these regional offices as less powerful than its Washington
director317—without noting why the importance of the Washington head of CFPB might support
CFPB’s argument for constitutionality rather than undermine it.
The best evidence about the importance of federal decentralization for executive power
from the behavior of federal officials themselves. In cases as old and foundational as the Steel
Seizure Cases,318 or as recent and important as Noel Canning,319 the Court has highlighted the
role of past practice in understanding branch boundaries. A common and conscious tool of
presidential control has always been to ensure that the most important officials to him are located
most closely to him. One of the most important decisions a President makes is who gets an
office close to the Oval Office.320 The Old Executive Office Building adjacent to the White
House originally housed key parts of the national security apparatus to ensure coordination, and
now houses other important officials in the Executive Office of the President, such as the Vice
President and the Office of Management and Budget.321
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Likewise, those concerned about excessive presidential power must redirect their
arguments because of their neglect of federal decentralization. A common critique of
presidential power is that it has become expansive and unconstrained.322 The common remedy to
mitigate this critique is to further empower a centralized federal actor—usually Congress or the
Supreme Court—to rein in presidential power. However, several of the most significant actions
of resistance to presidential power recently have been by those outside of Washington.
Majorities in both parties, for instance, have taken aggressive approaches on matters of national
security across the branches, and federal courts (in Washington) have largely validated most of
these actions.323 By contrast, Edward Snowden undermined presidential power by leaking
information that he uncovered while working in Japan for several years324 and then in Hawaii.325
Reality Leigh Winner leaked details of potential executive overreach by the Trump
Administration from Georgia.326
Conclusion
James Madison believed that the concentration of power was “the very definition of
tyranny.”327 The double security of federalism and the separation of powers would diffuse power
across institutions to prevent concentrations of sovereign authority. Madison also believed that
diffusing power would not just be an institutional design from the top that trickled down to shape
the lives of citizens, but also had to be supported by citizens themselves for diffusion to work.
Madison, in other words, believed that a “dependence on the people” would be the “primary
control on the government.”328
Citizens have always believed that a “primary control” on the federal government has
been and should be federal decentralization. Citizens understand institutions and individuals by
their locations. If all or the most important parts of the federal government were in Washington,
then the rich diversity of the American large republic would be neglected, and a narrow group of
individuals would control the country. While the identity of the protagonists and antagonists of
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federal decentralization has constantly shifted, one commonality is that Americans have shared a
belief that federal decentralization in one way or another at some point or another must be
employed for constitutional law to work.
Consider the strange bedfellows of federal decentralization that illustrate the breadth and
depth of support for it. President Ronald Reagan made his political name nationally by
delivering a famous speech in 1964 urging the election of Barry Goldwater as President. In this
speech, President Reagan decried the “far-distant capital.”329 Just twenty-two years earlier, the
President whose legacy Reagan promised to destroy—President Franklin Delano Roosevelt—
ordered 30,000 federal officials distributed throughout the Midwest, arguing that Washington
was an “isolated” capital in need of decentralization.330 Rohit Khanna, the new and progressive
Democratic member of the House of Representatives from Silicon Valley, supports more federal
decentralization,331 as does a more conservative Democratic member from Ohio (Tim Ryan)
critical of many of the policies that Khanna supports.332 Republicans in the House affiliated with
the Tea Party have supported more federal decentralization.333 From Roosevelt to Reagan, from
today’s left to today’s right, the arguments for federal decentralization have been varied in their
content but uniform in their sentiment: the separation of places is foundational to the American
system. It is time that legal scholars join this conversation.
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